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ABSTRACT 
 
The structure and organization of international manufacturing has changed over the past 
twenty years.  It seems as if manufacturing is moving towards emerging countries e.g. China 
or India, often to take advantage of lower labour costs. Whilst production cost is an important 
consideration in choosing a location for the factory, we argue that one should not become 
victim of a herd effect and that other parameters, such as quality, flexibility, transportation 
and energy costs need to be taken into consideration in the determination of the optimal 
manufacturing network. Relocating a factory is changing the strategic architecture of the 
company’s manufacturing network and requires a long term view and a good model to design 
the architecture of the manufacturing network. Based on a longitudinal empirical study of 
eight European multinational companies we have gained an understanding of the dynamics of 
a company’s manufacturing architecture. We observed that market entry drives the creation of 
new factories more than mere production cost, and that skills and knowledge can be a ticket 
for a safe future of the factory.  Over ten years, we observed an increase in the knowledge 
sharing role of factories.  And we also learnt that it is important to keep a significant variety of 
factories in order to provide flexibility in reshaping the strategic architecture of your 
manufacturing.   
 
Key words: international manufacturing, network management, manufacturing architecture 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 10 years the international manufacturing landscape has changed 
significantly.  We have seen a major shift in the allocation of production capacity across the 
world.  Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP has been reduced in many of the industrialized 
countries.  In the USA, for example, it has moved from 18.9% to 14.4 % of GDP in the period 
1995-2005, in the UK from 21.7 to 14.4%, and in Japan from 23.4 to 21%. At the same time, 
manufacturing activities have risen in China, India or Brazil, in line with the overall growth of 
their economy. When translated to the level of an organization the shifts are in some cases 
much stronger. Some companies have massively invested in outsourcing, or transferred their 
manufacturing networks completely to low labor cost countries.  A quick reading of the 
economic press may well suggest that manufacturing is moving massively towards emerging 
countries in search of lower labor costs in order to pursue cost reductions. But there may be 
other reasons. Some seem to shift their production towards emerging countries, because that is 
where the fastest market development is happening.  An example of this is the Renault Nissan 
group, which is shifting its production towards countries like Romania, Iran and the Russian 
Federation. 
In many cases, network reorganizations are driven by cost optimization. Whilst we 
acknowledge the importance of cost optimizations in a manufacturing network, we also 
strongly believe that the decision to relocate or close a factory should be taken within a 
broader perspective. Research on Manufacturing Strategy has argued consistently that 
factories are also sources of capabilities such as quality, flexibility, response time or reliability 
(Ferdows and De Meyer, 1992). Closing or opening a factory is a strategic decision, which 
will have an impact on the competitiveness of the company. The decision should therefore be 
taken with a strategic network perspective in mind.  
Based on a longitudinal empirical study, we have been able to observe the dynamics of 
the factory network.  The first stage of the study was an extensive survey of the factories of 
eight multinationals mainly based in Europe in 1995-1996. These companies were revisited in 
2005-2006 and interviewed in order to discover the current architecture of the factory 
network.  The study illustrated that the organization of manufacturing is indeed very dynamic. 
Whereas in the first round of our study, the eight companies had 59 factories, in the second 
round of our study, ten years later, about one third of the factories were either closed or sold, 
and roughly 40 factories had joined the company networks. Some of these factories were 
acquired, others were the result of mergers, and others again were greenfield projects.  
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We observed that the opening of the new sites was driven mainly by market entry.  
Compared to the mid-90s, we saw also in 2005-2006 a definite increase in the role of factories 
as sources of knowledge.  We also found evidence of the need to keep agility in the factory 
networks, in order to be able to manage the dynamics of production over the years. 
 
MANUFACTURING AS A NETWORK 
How does one analyze the network of factories? The research on manufacturing 
strategy has given us some interesting models that can support a senior technology manager in 
the decision making about this network. Hayes and Schmenner classify factories according to 
their focus. This focus can be the market, the product or a step in the process. Market focused 
factories will be more responsive to customer needs. Product or process focused factories 
enable the company to benefit from specialization and to build on its capabilities (Hayes and 
Schmenner, 1978). The choice between these three dimensions of focus will depend on the 
characteristics of the industry. For example, one would expect food factories to be closer to 
the market, while chemical factories will rather be where capabilities can easily be exploited. 
Ferdows (1997) argued that each factory has a specific and strategic role to fulfill for 
the organization: its role may for example be to serve a market, to act as a low-cost source of 
products or components, or to take the lead in the development and transfer of innovations. 
The concept of the lead factory, which shares its innovations and knowledge with other 
factories, suggests that multinational manufacturing companies are more than a set of isolated 
factories that exchange goods among each other.  
In our own work we have extended and detailed this approach. A manufacturing 
network is often seen as a supply chain, with goods (components, semi-finished products or 
end products) flowing between the factories in the network. That is obviously a correct view. 
But such a network can also be described as a network of knowledge, with innovations and 
information flowing between the factories. We actually argue, similar to Doz, Santos and 
Williamson, that the strength of a multinational manufacturing company lies precisely in its 
potential to exploit its network of knowledge (Doz, Santos and Williamson, 2001). They use 
this idea with respect to the product and service innovations developed by the firm. We apply 
this network concept to process innovation and manufacturing. We have developed a model 
that classifies factories according to their role in this network of knowledge. We will discuss 
this model later in this paper. 
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As a consequence, we argue that the decision to change the status of a factory should 
take into account the role the factory plays in the knowledge network of the company. In 
closing or relocating the factory, one is changing the strategic architecture of the network. 
And this may well completely upset or even destroy the medium to long term equilibrium in 
the network in order to obtain short term gains.  More specifically, we may be hurting the 
innovation flows in the network. This would be detrimental to the long term success of the 
network and the company. The question how to adjust the network need therefore to be 
answered on a strategic level.  
 
ABOUT THE RESEARCH 
 
The first phase: an in-depth survey in 1995-1996 
In 1995-1996, we carried out an in-depth survey of all the factories of eight 
multinational manufacturing companies. The headquarters of these companies were all located 
in Western Europe. The confectionary producer Callebaut, now part of the global Barry-
Callebaut group, was one of the cases, with manufacturing facilities in Belgium, the UK, 
Canada and the USA. Another interesting case has been Bekaert, producer of steel cord, 
which is a major supplier to the tire industry, with factories in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 
Yet another example was Samsonite Europe, producer of luggage, handbags, backpacks.  
At that time, we conducted interviews with executives in manufacturing and supply 
chain functions in headquarters, and we sent questionnaires to the factory managers and their 
management teams in each of the factories in the multinational network. The conclusions 
drawn from this research were then discussed with many managers from many different 
companies, in many different industries in executive programs and during consulting projects. 
This study has allowed us to develop a model describing the position and the role of factories 
in the international manufacturing network  (Vereecke et al 2002, and 2006). 
 
7 
 
The second phase: a round of in-depth interviews ten years later 
In 2005-2006, we revisited these eight companies in order to understand how the 
network had evolved over time. In this second round of the research, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with one or two senior managers in the headquarters of each of the companies. In 
the interviews, based on a structured questionnaire, we presented some of the questions as 
well as some of the results of the previous study to these managers, and asked them to rate the 
factories again on their strategic role and their network position. A detailed description of the 
methodology as well as an overview of the results of this second phase of the research can be 
found in Vereecke (2007). 
 
DESCRIBING OUR MODEL  
Based on the 1995-1996 data, we were able to classify the factories in four broad 
though clearly distinct categories of factories, as is shown in Figure 1. The four categories 
differ mainly in the way factories relate to other factories in the network and/or with 
headquarters in terms of knowledge exchange. 
Knowledge can flow between factories in different “formats”. One important way is 
the transfer of innovations in the network.  Indeed, an explicit flow of knowledge takes place 
whenever innovations developed in one site are transferred to and implemented in another 
factory in the network. A second and informal flow of knowledge occurs when managers of 
different sites talk to each other, or visit each other’s site. Therefore, the level of 
communication between managers across factories has been measured, as well as the number 
of days manufacturing staff people from each factory have visited the other factories in the 
network. On the basis of such different types of knowledge flows we could distinguish four 
different types of factories (Vereecke, Van Dierdonck and De Meyer (2006)). 
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
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The first category of factories consists of the “isolated” factories in the network. Few 
innovations reach this isolated factory and few, if any, innovations are transferred from here 
to other units; few manufacturing staff people come to visit such a factory, and in reverse also 
few manufacturing staff people from this factory go visit other factories. Moreover, there is 
little communication between the manufacturing staff people of this factory and the other 
manufacturing managers in the network. A producer of aluminum cans in our research had 
quite a few of these isolated factories. They were typically high performers, supplying 
commodity products to their local market, and relying on their own capabilities to improve 
their manufacturing processes. Some of them were green field factories, which ran in an 
efficient, reliable and independent way.  
Somewhat similar to the isolated factories are the “receiver factories”. They differ 
from the isolated factories on one aspect only: they receive quite a few innovations from other 
factories in the network and/or from headquarters. There can be a few different reasons for 
this ‘injection’ of innovations in the receiver factory. Some of these factories were 
underperforming, and needed external support to get the factory up to standard. Others were 
located so close to one of the sister factories, that they were run as ‘satellite factories’, under 
the supervision of the management team of the neighboring, typically larger, factory. Still 
other factories had to rely on external support to keep up to speed with rapidly changing 
technological innovation. A nice example in this respect was a state-of-the-art steel cord 
factory. This factory was the experimental unit in the network for the application of 
Computer-integrated Manufacturing. It was supposed to become the ‘model factory’ for the 
future, with zero defects and zero interruptions. In order to accomplish this, the factory 
received a lot of support from other factories and from development teams in the company. 
The third category of factories is very different from the previous two. It consists of 
factories that have established strong network relationships. These network players show a 
high level of communication with other units in the network and they exchange a lot of 
innovations with the other units. They not only transfer innovations to the other factories, they 
also benefit from innovations developed elsewhere. Typical for these factories is that they are 
frequently hosting visitors from other factories in the network and from headquarters. This is 
why we have labeled them the ‘hosting network players’. Quite a few of the hosting network 
players in our research were the factory closest to headquarters. They thus automatically 
occupied a central position in the network. Some interviewees referred to this factory as the 
‘mother factory’.  
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An example of a hosting network player was the steel cord factory located about fifty 
kilometer from the Bekaert headquarters. This factory was very flexible, and produced a large 
range of products, for a broad geographical market; its location close to the technical 
development center in headquarters turned this factory into a prototype testing center; 
engineers from all over the world would go through training in this factory; finally, the factory 
was considered to be a center of excellence for part of the product range of the company. 
We labeled the fourth category as ‘active network players’. The main difference 
between the hosting network players and this group lies in the intensity of communication and 
of innovation transfers, and the dominant direction of the flows of visitors. These are factories 
that communicate intensively with other units in the network; they actively share innovations 
with other units; and they are not only hosting visitors from other factories, their managers 
also pay a lot of visits to the other factories.  
An interesting example of an active network player was a small Samsonite factory in 
Belgium, close to the product design center in the European headquarters. This factory was a 
pilot center for new designs of luggage. It compensated for its high labor cost by excelling in 
the production of small runs of new products, with short delivery times. When the new 
product matured, it was then transferred to low-cost factories in Eastern Europe. 
 
FROM DESCRIPTION TO MANAGERIAL ACTION 
The question with any set of categories is “so what?”. How can one use this 
classification to help senior management to manage the strategic architecture of the factory 
network?  Since the development of this model a decade ago we learned through lots of 
interactions with executives that it helps to answer two critical questions: what is the ideal 
network and what is the relation between the type of factories and geography? Let us examine 
each of these briefly. 
  
1. How to achieve a balanced portfolio of factories 
 
An important question for senior managers is how many of each type of factories they 
would like to keep in the network. Do they need factories of each type? Or are some types 
redundant, or even counter-productive in the competition?  
Would it be possible for the company to survive without any network players? The 
answer is “no”, since the innovations that come out of these networkers are crucial for the 
sustainable competitiveness of the company.  
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Hosting network players are the sources of innovations in the manufacturing network, 
and should therefore be part of the portfolio. However, the size of the factory may at some 
point in time create diseconomies of scale. Or the location of the hosting network player, 
which is often close to the headquarters or to where the roots of the company are, may not be 
the optimal location to tap into new trends. If this is the case, the need for some active 
network players will arise. This probably explains why large pharmaceutical companies, e.g. 
Novartis from Switzerland, have subsidiaries in California or Boston, where they are close to 
the development of know-how in biogenetic engineering.  
But let’s face it, network players are expensive factories. Their role as developers and 
distributors of knowledge implies a need for investments and resources. Being networkers 
probably even implies some inefficiency. Their managers spend a lot of time traveling, the 
visitors in their factories “disturb” the normal operations in the factory, training takes time, 
networking also means time in meetings and other forums where information is shared. As a 
consequence, these factories should be allowed some slack capacity to be able to fulfill their 
role of hosts and network players. It wouldn’t be wise to allow for such inefficiencies in all 
factories.  
Therefore, the network players should be complemented with some isolated factories, 
which are run in a very lean, efficient and low cost way, as such safeguarding the overall cost 
of the manufacturing network. Moreover, isolated factories offer strategic flexibility to the 
network. In case of a geographical expansion into new markets, these isolated factories can be 
used as the bricks in building the international manufacturing network. Copying the concept 
of a factory and replicating it in distant markets provides an easy and rapid way to start 
serving these distant markets and maybe even to start sensing trends in these markets, which 
may then stimulate the development of innovations in the network players. This idea of 
“copy/paste factories” is especially typical for companies with low value density products and 
mature process technologies. A can producer, for example, will “copy/paste” similar factories 
all over its geographical market. 
Also, relocating isolated factories is relatively easy; it implies nothing more than a 
relocation of capacity. The shift in production in the textile industry illustrates this point. Over 
a period of roughly ten to fifteen years, textile producers have shifted production from North 
Africa or Mexico, over Mauritius, to Bangladesh, and finally China. “Picking up” the 
machinery and moving it to another country seems to be a relatively easy job. 
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Relocating network players is probably much more difficult. Their capability to serve 
as developers of knowledge may well be rooted in their location close to sources of 
knowledge or close to some specific expertise. For example, they may have a tight link to the 
R&D center of the company, or they may be located in a region with a long tradition of the 
company’s industrial activity. When Tupperware decided to build new facilities for its 
Belgian production, it could have decided to build the greenfield factory in a low labor cost 
country. However, management decided to build the new factory only a couple of kilometers 
away from the old facilities. The reason? It was the know-how of its workforce, and the 
proximity of R&D which allowed for interaction between design and manufacturing and for 
experimentation on the shop floor. Another example are automotive producers e.g. Daimler 
Chrysler. This company will probably always have some manufacturing facilities in the 
“golden triangle” for automotive design and production between Stuttgart, Mulhouse and 
Torino, because of the blend of knowledge available in this area, through sophisticated 
suppliers, universities specializing in research on the automotive industry, machine 
construction, and design labs. Yet at some point in time, automotive companies may want to 
understand trends in Japanese car factories, which may give them a need for active network 
players to tap into this knowledge. The Japanese Nissan factories in the Renault network may 
well have taken on the role of an active network player that brings Nissan’s knowledge in 
process engineering into the Renault network. Daimler Chrysler tried to do the same with 
Mitsubishi Motor Company, but has failed to take advantage of this venture.  
The same argument goes in favor of receiver factories. We need them in the network, 
for the same reasons as the isolated factories. For processes where technology is rapidly 
evolving, one probably needs receiver factories rather than isolated ones. The concept of the 
receiver factory is to be used if the factory has to keep up to speed with the latest 
technologies; the isolated factory is usually better suited for standardized production. 
Ultimately, one may even consider outsourcing the activity carried out in the isolated 
factory. In doing so, the total cost may be reduced, provided the activity is taken over by a 
partner who has specialized in it. Such a move does not harm the innovation power of the 
network, since the factory isn’t sharing any important knowledge with the other players in the 
network. 
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2. What is the relationship between type of factory and geography? 
 
Is there some natural geographical ‘preference’ for each of the types of factories? 
Would it be the case that isolated and receiver factories are typically located in low-labor cost 
countries? And that network players are by definition found in industrialized countries? This, 
we have learned over the years, doesn’t always reflect reality. Especially active network 
players could – and probably should - be located all over the world. The main question here is 
where interesting sources of knowledge are to be found. Tapping into a source of knowledge, 
and transferring this knowledge across the network, is the primary task of an active network 
player (De Meyer and Garg, 2006).  
The story is different for isolated or receiver factories. Although in theory these 
factories can be located anywhere, presence in high wage countries is probably not 
sustainable. Imagine an isolated factory in a high labor cost country, such as Japan, 
Switzerland or Belgium. This factory has a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the other 
factories in the company’s network. If the company runs into overcapacity, the decision to 
reduce capacity may easily go towards downsizing or even closure of this factory. In doing so, 
the company is simply “cutting out” capacity, without hurting any of its flows of innovation. 
The story would have been different if this factory were a network player. In this case, cutting 
capacity would also have meant cutting vital innovation flows, and therefore hurting the 
innovative capability and the competitiveness of the network. 
One of the Belgian factories in our study is a good example. This factory acted as a 
receiver: expertise from other factories in the network and from headquarters was transferred 
to this factory in order to improve its performance. In reverse, however, the factory had no 
innovations or best practices that it could share with the other factories. In a period of 
downsizing, this factory was the first “victim” and was closed. 
Consequently, there is likely to be some natural evolution for isolated and receiver 
factories in high wage countries. They either struggle for survival, or move towards lower 
wage countries. 
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THE DYNAMICS OF FACTORY NETWORKS 
 
The discussion of the two previous questions suggests that factory networks should 
evolve over time and that this evolution should be aligned with the change in the context and 
the strategy of the organization. It also suggests that the future of a factory depends to some 
extent on its current network position. These observations made us decide to go back to the 
companies we studied in 1995-1996, to see how they had evolved since then. 
This second round of the research clearly confirmed our expectation that companies 
and their manufacturing networks are very dynamic. Several companies had indeed changed 
significantly due to mergers and acquisitions. Their manufacturing networks had gone through 
rounds of rationalization and closing down of factories, acquisitions of other factories, and the 
start-up of greenfield factories.  
 
The globalisation of the factory networks 
 
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the globalization of the manufacturing networks of these eight 
companies. In 1995-1996, the eight multinationals studied had all together 59 factories: 42 
factories were located in Europe, spread over 14 different countries. The other 17 factories 
were spread over 10 different countries in East Asia and the Middle East, the USA and 
Canada, South Africa and Australia. (See Figure 2) 
 
Insert Figure 2 & 3 About Here 
 
By 2005-2006, the eight multinationals had in total 83 factories: 42 factories were 
located in Europe, spread over 13 different countries. The other 41 factories were spread over 
18 different countries in East Asia and the Middle East, the USA and Canada, Africa and 
Australia. (See Figure 2) 
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It is clear that the past 10 years have been characterized by increased globalization: 
whereas in 1995-1996 the factory networks of the 8 multinationals were dominantly European 
with a few sites in other continents, they now have become truly global, at least in their 
manufacturing. 
Of the 59 factories in the networks in 1995-1996, 18 had disappeared, while 40 new 
ones had joined the networks, either through acquisitions, or as greenfield factories. (See 
Figure 4). Of the 18 factories that have disappeared from the manufacturing networks since 
1995-1996, most had been closed down. A few factories had been transferred to other 
companies; some were owned together with partners, with whom the partnership had been 
stopped. 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
 
Location advantage changes over time 
Clearly, the manufacturing networks are very dynamic. This raises the question what 
drives the closure of old and the location of new factories. To answer this question, we first 
needed to understand the advantage provided by the location of the factory. The managers 
were therefore asked to select the primary advantage for each of their factories from a long list 
of possible location factors, which were grouped into a few categories: the factory’s proximity 
to suppliers, the availability of labor, the availability of skills and know-how, the factory’s 
proximity to the market, a set of social or political factors, a set of factors related to 
competition, the availability of energy, and a few other factors. We refer to Exhibit 1 for this 
list of drivers for establishing or exploiting a factory.  
Table 1 lists the primary advantage that was offered by the location of the 59 factories 
in the eight multinationals in 1995-1996. The table distinguishes two groups of factories; the 
ones that were in the network in 1995-1996 but since then have disappeared from the 
networks; and the “survivors”, that is the factories that were in the network in 1995-1996 and 
still are ten years later. 
Table 2 lists the primary advantage that is offered by the location of the 82 factories in 
the eight multinationals in 2005-2006. Again we distinguish two groups of factories: the same 
group of “survivors” that were already in the networks in 1995-1996, and the “newcomers” 
that have joined the networks since 1995-1996. 
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Insert Table 1 & 2 About Here 
Market proximity clearly was and still is the dominant driver for the location of a 
factory. Only 8 of the 82 factories have labor cost as the primary driver for the factory 
location. Whilst this doesn’t imply that only 8 factories are located in low-labor-cost 
countries, it does mean that the internationalization of manufacturing networks is driven more 
dominantly by a search for markets, rather than delocalization in search of low-labor cost. Our 
research thus confirms other studies which have shown that delocalization of factories purely 
for cost reasons is less important than is sometimes assumed (OECD 2006).  
Table 1 suggests that proportionally less factories which have the market or skills and 
know-how as their main location advantage have disappeared; at the same time proportionally 
more factories which have labor cost as their main advantage have disappeared. And not 
surprisingly, three of the four factories for which no real location advantage could be 
mentioned in 1995-1996 have also disappeared. 
Clearly skills, know-how and market proximity are stable location advantages. Low 
labor cost, and lack of any major advantage is a less stable condition for a factory to operate 
in.  
 
 
More factories are acting as network players  
Error! Reference source not found. shows the proportion of factories that act as 
isolated factories, receivers, hosting and active network players, compared to ten years ago.  
Insert Figure 5 About Here 
One of our most interesting observations is that over the past ten years, the proportion 
of active network players has increased, whereas the proportion of isolated factories has 
decreased. This may suggest that more factories today are considered as a source of know-
how for the network, and thus as an asset for the company.  
To some extent, this may be a natural evolution. Building network relations takes time. 
So, the longer a factory is in the network, the stronger its ties are with the other factories in the 
network. However, the detailed data reveal that time is not the only explaining factor. 
Underlying the shift from isolated to network players are two distinct evolutions.  
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Some isolated and receiver plants have disappeared over time; some others have 
actively developed into network players. Table 3 and Table 4 show the evidence of these two 
evolutions. 
 
Insert Table 3 & 4 About Here 
 
Table 3 shows that out of the ten factories that have disappeared from the networks 
since 1995-1996 only one was a network player. Nine out of the ten that disappeared were 
isolated or receiver factories.  
A comparison of the group of survivors in Table 3 and Table 4 tells us that the 
category of the isolated factories has been shrinking. Seven of these isolated plants have 
moved into a different position. The category of the active network players on the other hand 
has grown substantially. Clearly, some of the isolated factories and possibly also a few 
receiver factories have over time developed into network players, especially active network 
players.  
These results have to be interpreted with some care. In the 1995-1996 study the 
network position of the factories had been measured based on a comprehensive set of data, 
collected via the managers in headquarters as well as in the plants. In the 2005-2006 study, the 
network position has been measured through interviews with managers in headquarters only. 
Our results for 2005-2006 are based on their perception and judgment, while the results for 
1995-1996 were based on perception as well as hard data. It could be that some of the 
factories have been classified as “active network player” because this seemed more desirable 
to the interviewee. On the other hand, we have clear indications that the level of inter-unit 
activity has indeed increased over the past ten years. Several interviewees have stressed the 
importance of networking, as can be witnessed from some of the comments they made during 
the interviews. (See insert 1)  They mentioned many actions taken to stimulate the sharing of 
experiences and best practices: working groups, audit teams, physical and virtual meetings, 
visits to factories, the use of intranet systems and databases, and a focus on KPIs for 
benchmarking. 
 
 
17 
 
Insert 1 
Selected comments about the networking role of factories 
 
  “Active and hosting network players carry a lot of know-how. This is very “time 
constant”. It is saved in the heads of people, and therefore has little mobility. But even 
know-how is perishable. Even factories that have the know-how need to upgrade 
themselves. In order to remain a network player, a factory should not react in a 
defensive way and rely on its know-how. The role of an active network player is a 
necessity for the future.” 
 “Working groups have been defined to identify learning opportunities across factories. 
It starts with identifying some quick wins to make the factories learn from the other 
factories. An investment plan has been drawn to bring all factories to the same level.” 
 “The company made a huge step compared to 1996. We have broken with this 
situation of the past (of receiver and isolated factories) which was the result of history, 
of the mix of different cultures, of people being shy and modest in what they could 
bring. The company’s big success is that it has become a real open company. There are 
regular meetings by function (HR, production, quality, logistics), in headquarters or in 
the factories, every year. Some people have been transferred to the factories.”  
 “A best practices network/database has been developed, there are simple and shared 
KPIs to make comparison easy, there is an intranet system for sharing experience. 
These actions have turned us into a company of active network players.” 
 “We have regular meetings of the site managers, on a regional basis. These meetings 
mostly take place in one of the factories.”  
 “We have small teams of people in charge of process improvements. They visit a 
factory and audit a line in this factory, together with the person responsible at the site 
and with specialists from other sites. They analyse KPIs, they check how the line is 
controlled, and they compare with other sites. In doing so, best practices are identified 
and know-how is shared. It also stimulates competition between the sites. The goal of 
this practice is to reduce the cost with 5% each year. So in fact, there are no real 
isolated factories in the network.” 
 “There is more networking than in the past: a lot of traveling, but also many virtual 
meetings (conference call, telephone councils).”  
 “In the past, the company considered know-how as very specific to each of the 
factories. Today, the company tries to benefit from the sharing of know-how. The 
factory starts to take a more active position: now and then, people from the factory 
travel to other factories to set up new lines.” 
 “The factory acts as a host: it shares innovations with other players in the network, its 
staff frequently visits other factories, and staff from headquarters frequently visits the 
factory.”  
 
During the interviews we also learned from several managers that the development of 
network relations was not a matter of luck. Rather, it was the result of a clear and explicit 
strategy, in some cases regarded as a necessity for survival of the company. Some comments 
in insert 2 may illustrate this. 
18 
 
 
 
Insert 2 
Selected comments about the drivers for building network relations 
 
  “There is strong pressure to make the factory play an active network role. The factory 
has to become a centre of excellence, but this takes time. Informal contacts need to 
grow in the short term.”  
 “The change has been imposed on us by the difficult business environment. (…) 
Moreover, it is the way competition works. We simply have no choice.” 
 “No doubt, all factories are network players now. If not, it would have been a 
disaster!” 
 
Overall, we dare to propose that the companies in our sample have preserved their 
competitiveness by shedding some of the factories that did not contribute to the knowledge 
creation, and by committing a larger part of their network to knowledge creation. that does not 
mean that they got rid of all isolated factories or receivers. on the contrary, they did even 
create quite a few new ones. these factories still have an important role to play, as we will see 
in the next section, in preserving the flexibility in the network.  
 
Factory networks offer strategic flexibility 
Table 3 showed that some of the isolated and several of the receiver factories have 
disappeared, whereas none of the hosting and only one of the active network players has 
disappeared. We should add to this that for the one network player which has indeed been 
closed, the activity did not disappear. Most of its activities (and likewise its personnel) have 
been transferred to another factory of the company, only fifty kilometers away, where it is 
organized as a “plant in the plant”. So whereas the factory itself has been closed, its activities 
have remained in the region.   
The first conclusion is that the non-network players (isolated factories and receivers) 
are clearly the source of flexibility in the strategic architecture of the factory network. Nine 
factories disposed of (Table 3) and 24 created (Table 4) over ten years shows a remarkable 
flexibility. This is a change in total of 31 factories in eight companies, or about 4 per company 
over a period of ten years.   
The second conclusion is that network players may have a more stable future than the 
isolated and the receiver factories. This was a conclusion that was hypothesized on the basis 
of the results of the 1995-1996 study, and has now, after ten years, indeed been confirmed. 
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The high survival rate among the network players, and the low survival rate among the 
isolated and receiver factories, give a clear suggestion about how factory managers can 
safeguard their factory, especially in high labor cost countries. Figure 5 
Evolution of network position of factories since 1995-1996 (in % of total) 
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Table 5 shows the development of the factories located in high labor cost countries in Western 
and Southern Europe only, and this again over the past ten years. Isolated and receiver 
factories have been combined into a category of the “non-networkers”; hosting and active 
network players have been combined into a category of the “networkers”. With the exception 
of the factory mentioned earlier, all networkers have survived, while 9 out of 23 non-
networkers have disappeared from the network. Interestingly, 7 of the non-networkers have 
adapted their position over the past ten years, and are now playing a network role. Only the 
future can show what happens to the other 7 factories that stayed in their non-networking role. 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
A survival strategy in countries with relatively high wages seems to be to either 
maintain or to build network relations with the other factories in the network. Innovativeness 
in itself seems to be insufficient for survival. The willingness to share the innovations with the 
other players in the network is crucial. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The outcome of the research 
We started by arguing that when it comes to decisions about factory relocation one 
should take a strategic approach.  It would be all too easy to fall in into the trap of shifting 
factories to emerging countries simply to reap the benefits of low labor cost manufacturing.  
You may need to relocate factories to low-cost production countries and we all may have to 
go to China or India for market reasons.  But we would like to make the plea to look beyond 
the cost of the manufacturing network and to develop a truly strategic view of the factory 
network as a learning network. 
In order to do so, we proposed a model that takes into account the flow of knowledge 
between the factories and within the organization.   
21 
 
Based on a decade of experience with this model, we have learned that it proves to be 
a useful framework to analyse the dynamics of a factory network, as well as the relationship 
between location and characteristics of a factory. Our longitudinal research has helped us to 
confirm and refine some of the assertions we made based on the model. 
Not to our surprise, we found that the eight companies in our sample had globalised 
significantly their manufacturing network over the last ten years.  They have closed and 
opened factories, have expanded their global reach and seem to be doing quite well.  In their 
expansion, the main driver has been the market and to a lesser extent, the development of 
skills and know-how.  Only a minor number of factories were created solely in response to a 
need for lower production costs. This goes somewhat against popular beliefs, but is in line 
with what others have suggested. 
We observed that multinationals in mature economies tried to preserve their 
competitiveness by upgrading the capability of the average factory to produce knowledge and 
by integrating them into the knowledge network. This does however not go completely to the 
detriment of the flexibility of the network, which is determined by the existence of isolated 
factories and receiver factories. The flexibility to shape and reshape the architecture of the 
manufacturing network is highly dependent on the availability of these non-network players. 
 
And what does it mean for the manager? 
The role of a factory in a network should be dynamic. But the control over these 
dynamics should not be left in the hands of the factory managers only, since it would result in 
an evolution of the individual nodes only. There is a need for a coordinated evolution of the 
network, i.e. of both its nodes and its flows. For the senior manager sitting in headquarters and 
orchestrating the manufacturing network, the main message coming from our research is that 
the design of the manufacturing network is more than a decision of what to produce where 
and how to organize the logistic flows. It is also about the design and management of the 
flows of innovation and know-how. One should not leave this to chance; rather, one should 
also see this as a strategic decision. Facilitating, building and maintaining network relations 
among factories creates flows of innovation, which may be key to competitiveness. However, 
this takes time and it requires a willingness to share know-how. Headquarters play an 
important role in creating the right culture for this openness, and in offering systems to 
support the network relations. 
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Yet, at the same time, companies may need some isolated or receiver factories, since 
they are an “easy” add-on to a network; they offer strategic flexibility to networks that are in 
expansion. This expansion is an important element in the development of international 
companies, since it puts them on the map of the true global players.  
By adding factories to the network in the distant locations, international players can 
tap into growing markets. Initially for the volume and return they offer; gradually for the 
know-how that is available in these markets. This probably means that these isolated or 
receiver factories will gradually evolve into network players. 
This brings us to some final comments on offshoring and outsourcing of 
manufacturing to emerging countries. While strategically important to safeguard and improve 
the competitiveness of the multinational and thus unavoidable, it is often perceived as unfair 
at the level of the factory. We are convinced that it is unavoidable for some of the isolated and 
receiving factories in high labor cost countries to be closed down and moved around. But 
these factories may protect themselves, not by complaining when it is too late, but rather by 
anticipating through building network relationships. This takes time, it requires careful 
strategic planning, and the willingness of headquarters to invest in these network 
relationships. It requires a high level of management attention, commitment and resources. In 
particular, personal relationships should be nurtured for knowledge transfers to take place. 
Network players on the other hand should understand the importance of their role in the 
network, and should keep on investing in their own innovation capability, as well as in the 
transfer of their knowledge to the other players in the network. While sharing their knowledge 
may seem too generous in the short term, it is precisely their reason for existence, and their 
guarantee for survival in the long term. 
 
 
 
23 
 
REFERENCES 
 
DE MEYER A. and S. GARG, “Inspire to Innovate: Management and Innovation in Asia”, 
2006 
DOZ Y., J. SANTOS and P. WILLIAMSON, "From Global to Metanational", Harvard 
Business School Press, 2001 
FERDOWS K., “Making the Most of Foreign Factories” Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb, 
1997 
FERDOWS K. and A. DE MEYER, “Lasting Improvements in Manufacturing”, Journal of 
Operations Management, 1992 
HAYES R.H. and R.W. SCHMENNER, “How should you Organise Manufacturing ?” 
Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb, pp. 105-118, 1978 
OECD, Productivity Impacts of Offshoring and Outsourcing: a review, STI Working Paper 
2006/1, 2006 
VEREECKE A. and R. VAN DIERDONCK, “The strategic role of the plant: testing Ferdows’ 
model”, International Journal of Operations and Production Management,Vol 22, nr 5, pp. 
492-514, 2002 
VEREECKE, A., VAN DIERDONCK R. and A. DE MEYER, “A typology of plants in 
global manufacturing networks”, Management Science, Vol 52, Nr 11, pp. 1737-1750, 2006 
VEREECKE A., “Network relations in multinational manufacturing companies”, FDC 
research report, ISBN 9789078858065, 2007 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of Flanders District of Creativity for this 
research.  
24 
 
 
EXHIBIT 1 
Potential drivers for establishing/exploiting a factory 
 
Proximity to suppliers 
• to benefit from rapid/reliable delivery from suppliers and/or low transport costs 
• to be close to low cost suppliers  
• to facilitate cooperation with suppliers in product design, planning, etc. 
• to have access to source of raw materials 
 
Availability of labor 
• to take advantage of low-cost labor 
• to take advantage of the availability of workers 
• to take advantage of favorable social climate (high productivity, low absenteeism rate, weak unionization, 
etc.) 
 
Availability of skills and know-how 
• to take advantage of highly qualified workers 
• to take advantage of skilled engineers 
• to take advantage of managerial/organizational skills 
• to be close to the source of technological know-how (university, research institute, etc.) 
 
Proximity to market 
• to provide rapid/reliable delivery to customers, at low transport costs 
• to adapt products to local taste and/or to facilitate co-operation with customers in product design, planning, 
etc. 
• to provide fast service or technical support to customers 
 
Social / Political 
• to benefit from tax breaks and/or investment incentives 
• to overcome trade barriers 
• to benefit from favorable or less stringent environmental regulations 
• to reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations 
 
Competition 
• to be close to major competitors 
• to prevent major competitors from establishing a manufacturing facility in the area 
• to capture/maintain market share 
 
Energy 
• to take advantage of low-cost energy 
 
Other 
• to take advantage of highly qualitative environment (air, water, noise, climate) 
• to create a high quality of life for employees 
• the place of residence of the owner 
• to seize a provided opportunity 
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FIGURE 1 
Network role of the factory 
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FIGURE 2 
Location of factories studied in 1995-1996 
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FIGURE 3 
Location of factories studied in 2005-2006 
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FIGURE 4 
Evolution of number of factories since 1995 
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TABLE 1 
Evolution of primary location advantages since 1995-1996 
 
 
 
 
 
primary advantage of the factory  
in 1995-1996 
nr of factories 
that have 
disappeared 
since  
1995-1996 
nr of factories 
that have 
survived 
total nr  
of factories 
Proximity to suppliers 0 0 0 
Availability of labor 6 3 9 
Availability of know-how 0 1 1 
Availability of skill 1 6 7 
Proximity to the market 8 30 38 
Social/political drivers 0 0 0 
Competition/other drivers 0 0 0 
No advantage 3 1 4 
Total nr of factories 18 41 59 
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TABLE 2 
History of primary location advantages in 2005-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
primary advantage of the factory 
in 2005-2006 
nr of 
newcomers 
that have 
joined since 
1995-1996 
nr of factories 
that have 
survived 
total nr  
of factories 
Proximity to suppliers 6 1 7 
Availability of labor 4 4 8 
Availability of know-how 1 3 4 
Availability of skill 1 3 4 
Proximity to the market 28 24 52 
Social/political drivers 0 2 2 
Competition/other drivers 2 0 2 
No advantage 0 3 3 
Total nr of factories 42 401 82 
   
 
                                               
 
1
 The number of survivors in table 1 and 2 differs because of missing data 
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TABLE 3 
Evolution of network position of factories since 1995-1996 
 
network position of the factory 
in 1995-1996 
nr of factories 
that have 
disappeared 
since 1995-
1996 
nr of factories 
that have 
survived 
total 
Isolated factory 2 9 11 
Receiver factory 7 19 26 
Hosting network player 0 8 8 
Active network player 1 3 4 
Total nr of factories 10 39 492 
 
                                               
 
2
 Data on 10 factories out of 59 is missing 
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TABLE 4 
History of network position of factories in 2005-2006 
 
 
network position of the factory 
in 2005-2006 
nr of 
newcomers 
that have 
joined since 
1995-1996 
nr of factories 
that have 
survived 
total 
Isolated factory 2 2 4 
Receiver factory 22 18 40 
Hosting network player 4 9 13 
Active network player 10 11 21 
Total nr of factories 38 40 783 
   
                                               
 
3
 Data on 4 factories out of 82 is missing 
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FIGURE 5 
Evolution of network position of factories since 1995-1996 (in % of total) 
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TABLE 5 
Development of factories in Western and Southern Europe 
 
 disappered non-networker 
in 2005-2006 
networker 
in 2005-2006 
total 
non-networker 
 in 1995-1996 
9 7 7 23 
networker 
in 1995-1996 
1 0 8 9 
   
 
